Liberal prostitution policy aims at improving labour conditions for prostitutes and protecting victims of forced prostitution. Its policy orientation predicts that the policy choice of liberalizing prostitution is positively associated with better protection policy for trafficking victims and enhanced anti-trafficking measures. In this paper, I investigate empirically whether the legalization of prostitution improves protection policy for victims, as it is presumed. The results of my analysis -using data from 149 countries for the period of 2001-2011 -suggest that the liberalisation of prostitution does not lead to better protection and, in some cases, legalized prostitution can be detrimental to protecting victims of human trafficking.
Introduction
Prostitution is often said to be one of the oldest occupations. However, in many countries, prostitution is prohibited for moral, public health and order reasons. Even in countries where prostitution is allowed -such as Germany, the justifications for the legalization and the effects of liberalized prostitution still feature in public debates.
There are two main conflicting views on dealing with the question, whether or not prostitution should be allowed. First, abolitionists, who share their view with radical feminism, argue that prostitution is intrinsically exploitative and violates women's rights. Therefore, they support the prohibition of all forms of prostitution. On the other hand, there exist proponents of the legalization of prostitution whose view has originated from liberal feminism. They consider prostitution as a free choice of employment for women (and men as well to some extent) and legalization as an effective way to improve labor conditions for sex workers. The two positions also differ in dealing with the problem of forced prostitution and human trafficking (in this paper, I use both terms simultaneously, as they generally refer to the same problem as far as the focus of this paper is concerned). The former argues that the purchase of commercial sex should be criminalized in order to combat human trafficking, while the latter separates the problem from prostitution as such and proposes to fight human trafficking by implementing anti-trafficking measures, while allowing prostitution in general.
In fact, for the liberal position, reducing the problem of forced prostitution is central to the success of the policy because the liberal prostitution regime aims at improving working conditions and providing protection for prostitutes (Outshoorn 2005) . On the other hand, the liberal prostitution regime is often criticized as liberating the demand for commercial sex and prostitution business only, rather than improving the working conditions of prostitutes themselves, despite advocating free choice of occupation for prostitutes (Raymond 2004) . Furthermore, several recent empirical studies (for instance, Cho et al. 2013 and Kotsadam 2013) suggest evidence that legalized prostitution creates a side effect inducing greater human trafficking flows into the country. Among them, Cho et al. (2013) point out that legalization tends to expand prostitution markets, possibly by de-stigmatizing demand. At the same time, the enlarged markets may also scale up the magnitudes of human trafficking inflows, if increasing demand is not met by proportionally increasing voluntary supply of prostitution -which potentially is the case in many developed countries where women have other employment opportunities other than prostitution. In this case, implementing stronger efforts that aim at protecting victims and fighting trafficking becomes more crucial to the liberal prostitution regime to avoid exacerbate forced prostitution.
In this paper, I investigate the policy linkage between liberalised prostitution and victim protection by setting a question, whether or not the liberal prostitution regime leads to better protection for victims of human trafficking. In fact, this question is not just a normative one but involves political economy issues in implementing victim protection policy. This is because the majority of victims of forced prostitution represent not only vulnerable populations but also irregular migrants from the developing world, making the implementation of the policy politically unpopular and tricky.
My empirical analysis using a global sample of data from 149 countries for the period of [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] shows that the liberal prostitution regime is at best irrelevant to victim protection, if not negative -the negative effect found in some cases, contradicting its prescribed policy mandate.
Instead, victim protection is a function of general institutional quality and gender empowerment, as well as the endogenous effect driven by the severity of the crime. On the other hand, the presence of migrant populations in a country has a negative effect on victim protection, suggesting that policy makers are reluctant to grant protection to victims of human trafficking when many migrants already exist in the country. This negative effect of migration implicates a plausible explanation as to why the policy mandate of better labour protection for victims, advocated by the liberal policy, is not fulfilled.
My paper continues in the following structure. In section 2, I discuss the liberal and abolitionist positions on the legality of prostitution in more detail. Section 3 presents the research design, including the model of victim protection, data and identification strategy. Section 4 follows with results and section 5 concludes the paper.
Debates on Prostitution and Human Trafficking
Human trafficking has often been discussed in the context of prostitution, as it is initially defined as transferring women (or persons) for the purpose of sexual exploitation (see the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, 1949) . Therefore, in policy debates on whether or not prostitution should be allowed, human trafficking poses a crucial question, is human trafficking an inevitable consequence of prostitution? Answering this question involves not only how to define victims of human trafficking but also how to view prostitutes in general. In this regard, two deeply divided positions debate and suggest different policy proposals on prostitution and human trafficking.
First, radical feminism views prostitution as a form of oppression against women. The proponents of this position argue that prostitution itself is a sexual slavery and prostitutes are victims of such sexual violence (Hughes and Roche 1999) . Therefore, they do not distinguish prostitution from forced prostitution or human trafficking because, in their view, prostitution is always forced by its nature and no truly voluntary prostitution exists (Outshoorn 2005) . In other words, the concept of forced prostitution is a redundancy of prostitution per se. Accordingly, radical feminists support the abolition of prostitution as the best way to protect women and fight human trafficking. In addition, they predict that legalizing prostitution will increase the demand for commercial sex and the consequent extension of prostitution markets induces more human trafficking.
On the other hand, liberal feminism opposes this view. Proponents of liberal feminism consider prostitution as a free choice of employment for women and consequently, prostitution as a legitimate occupation (Chapkis 1997) . In their view, women should be allowed to be sexually active and/or support themselves financially through prostitution. According to the liberal position, prostitutes are sex workers but not victims. Liberal feminists acknowledge that the problem of human trafficking and forced prostitution exists but they distinguish it from voluntary prostitution. In other words, they argue that prostitution is not a problem but human trafficking/forced prostitution is. Accordingly, proponents of this position propose to legalize prostitution as the best way to improve labour conditions for prostitutes. In regards to human trafficking, they suggest taking separate measures under criminal law and implementing victim protection and anti-trafficking measures actions (Outshoorn 2005 ).
As discussed above, the two positions propose two opposing policy solutions in dealing with prostitution and human trafficking. The radical position supports the prohibition of prostitution as the best way to reduce human trafficking, while the liberal position focuses on strengthening anti-trafficking measures instead of criminalizing prostitution as a whole.
Essentially these positions relate to their proponent's views on the standing of women in society and sexual morality: sex domination and victimization for the former vs. sex work for the latter. However, the discussions become more complicated when one takes into account the foreignization of prostitution, i.e. foreign prostitutes from developing countries dominate the supply of prostitution services in the developed world. Indeed, the foreignization of prostitution has become a widespread phenomenon in the West for the last several decades, alongside increasing international migration and income disparity across countries, as well as growing sexual liberalism in the western world (Truong 1990 ).
This observation on the foreign majority of prostitutes links the debates of prostitution and human trafficking with migration. The radical position of abolitionists may still remain consistent with its argument because its policy proposal is basically to criminalize (demand for) prostitution and consider all women in prostitution as victims. However, the phenomenon of foreign prostitutes is likely to challenge the liberal position by questioning whether its arguments supporting labour rights of prostitutes are still valid, given that the majority of prostitutes do not hold legal status -as they are irregular immigrants -and therefore are not eligible to be granted such rights under the immigration laws of most countries, regardless of the legality of prostitution.
With this respect, the fact that the majority of trafficking victims are foreign migrants further complicates the issues of strengthening victim protection. On the one hand, victim protection is an important policy objective for the liberal policy. This objective will become a more serious issue if the liberalization of prostitution does not increase the provision of voluntary prostitution services, and instead an increased demand for prostitution is filled by forced prostitution, exacerbating the problem of human trafficking as has been highlighted by several empirical studies. In this case, victim protection becomes central to the success of the liberal prostitution policy, given that improving labour conditions for prostitutes and protecting them from forced prostitution is its policy mandate. On the other hand, such protection and assistance for victims -who are mostly irregular migrants -may create political economy problems in pursuing the policy because granting amnesty and providing support for illegal migrants might be an unpopular policy stance for politicians and, furthermore, can be seen as a lenient migration policy which, in turn, likely induces further illicit migration flows into the country (Simmons and Lloyd 2010) . Thirdly, the dimension of gender equality is a likely to influence the policy choice of victim protection. Human trafficking is originally defined as the forced transfer of women for the purpose of forced prostitution (United Nations 1949), thus the gender aspect of human trafficking is inherent. Even if expanding the spheres of human trafficking into forced labour and labour exploitation delinking the explicitly designated gendered definition from human trafficking, the gender aspect remains, as victims of human trafficking are dominantly women and girls exploited for sexual purposes (IOM 2010) . Several recent studies document empirical evidence that women's empowerment can be a driving force for better protection of trafficking victims (Bartilow 2010; Cho et al. forthcoming) , possibly because female policy-makers and their constituents tend to support policies related to women's well-beings and feminized issues (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004) . However, the impact of women's empowerment on victim protection may not be straightforward, given that the majority of victims are foreign female migrants who do not have political voice in the country where they are trafficked into and it may not be always the case that domestic women care about the well-being of foreign migrants in the same manner as they do for their own people.
Forth is the dimension of migration. Human trafficking often involves international bordercrossing and transferring of migrants for the purpose of exploitation, although internal trafficking also exists. According to the IOM (2010), most victims of human trafficking are initially migrants having fallen into trafficking during their journey to the destination country.
Thus, determinants of migration often overlap with factors triggering human trafficking (Mahmoud and Trebesch 2010) . With this in mind, it is reasonable to conjecture that migration affects the policy-choice of anti-trafficking. On the one hand, the existence of migrants in a destination country may affect anti-trafficking policy positively, assuming that migrants are empowered and therefore vocalize their voice in politics in their new country. On the other hand, migration may also have a negative effect on anti-trafficking policy, if local constituents are afraid of growing migrant communities in their own country and speculate that better protection for victims of human trafficking will induce more migration flows into the country.
Finally, there is the dimension of crime. The choice of crime policy is endogenous to the prevalence of the crime. It leads to the prediction that the higher the prevalence of human trafficking incidences, the stricter anti-trafficking policy is enforced. In other words, the more victims of human trafficking exist the better protection policy will be presumably implemented.
Data
The main independent variable of interest is the legality of prostitution. Following Cho et al. (2013) , I construct a dummy variable of prostitution law, indicating whether or not prostitution is allowed in a country for a given year (1 being legalized prostitution and 0 otherwise).
Different from Cho et al. (2013) In addition to protection, the sub-dimensions of the 3P Index measuring prosecution and prevention policies are further employed as alternative measurements of the dependent variable. The former evaluates the policy adoption and enforcement punishing perpetrators of human trafficking and the latter preventive policy actions against human trafficking including public awareness programs, border control and training of governmental officials as well as policy coordination and collaboration. Alongside the protection index, these two indices have a five-point scale, the highest score being best and the lowest worst.
Empirical Strategy
The main estimation is based on time-series cross-country data from up to 149 countries for the period of 2001-2011. The sample includes as many countries as possible given the data availability of the protection index and prostitution law. The baseline model takes the following form:
The dependent variable, y, represents the level of protection policy measured by the 3P Index, while Prostitution, the main independent variable of interest, is a dummy variable indicating whether prostitution is legal in country i given year t. Alternatively, the dependent variable is the policy levels of prevention and prosecution, respectively. The model is non-linear because the dependent variable has an ordinal structure of a five-point scale.
X is a vector of determinants of victim protection policy, consisting of the dimensions of institution, migration, gender and crime, as discussed in section 2. The institutional factors include income (economic factor), (control of) corruption, democracy (political factors) and the membership of the Anti-trafficking Protocol (international factor). The gender dimension is proxied with female labour force participation rates reflecting women's economic empowerment and professional engagement in society. The migration dimension is measured by the share of migrants in total populations. For the crime dimension, the levels of human trafficking in-and outflows are taken into account. The data sources and descriptive statistics are provided in appendices 2 and 3.
Vector Z includes time-invariant variables reflecting cultural factors which may influence the level of protection policy. These variables are included particularly because controlling for time-invariant effects by country-fixed effects may cause incidental parameter problems and result in biased estimations in a non-linear model (Lancaster 2000) . Thus, instead of countryfixed effects, I include as many time-invariant variables as possible in order to address country heterogeneity. Accordingly, Z consists of regional dummies, share of major religions in total populations (Christian, Buddhist and Muslim) and legal origin variables, following Potrafke (2013). Again, detailed information on these variables can be found in appendices 2 and 3.
Finally, t is year-dummies reflecting time effects and u is an idiosyncratic error term.
Assuming that the impact of the legal standing of prostitution may not be contemporary, I lag the prostitution law variable for one year, in order to capture any delayed effects of prostitution policy on protection (and prosecution and prevention). In this case, the model takes the form below: 
Given that the dependent variable has an ordinal structure (score 1 -5), the model is estimated using ordered logit with time-fixed effects for the panel analysis. However, country-specific fixed effects capturing time-invariant country characteristics are not controlled for -besides the variables included in vector Z -because of the incidental parameter problem, mentioned above. I will further discuss this issue and conduct additional analysis in the following sections.
For the cross-sectional analysis, the dependent variable no longer has an ordinal structure by averaging values of the period of investigation and thus, OLS estimation is employed. Both in panel and cross-sectional analyses, robust standard errors are applied correcting for heteroscedasticity.
Endogeneity Concern
The baseline model above includes as many time-varying and time-invariant determinants of protection policy as possible, however the model may still be subject to omitted variable biases, as literature suggests (for instance, Fajnzylber et al. 2002) . In order to address effects driven by non-included variables, I first employ country-fixed effects estimation capturing unobserved, time-invariant effects -mainly cultural factors in this case -that may affect protection policy.
As discussed above, the inclusion of country-fixed effects in an ordinal model leads to the incidental parameter problem resulting in biased estimation. With this in mind, I employ the Blow Up and Cluster (BUC) ordered logit two-way fixed effects estimator (Baetschmann et al. 2011) , which is the method specifically designed to reduce such biases.
The BUC estimator is a modification of Das and van Soest's (1999) method that takes advantage of the fact that dichotomizing and estimating at every possible common cutoff point (for instance, k=1,...,5 for the protection policy score) provides a consistent estimate of β. Secondly, besides the effects of unobserved, time-invariant variables addressed above, there might still be omitted variable biases caused by the exclusion of time-varying explanatory variables -for instance, social development factors reflecting public awareness and attitudes towards liberalism. Taking this issue into account, I make use of instruments in order to minimize the (potential) biases. In doing so, I first exploit internal instruments by using the system-GMM estimator developed in Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . This method has several advantages. It addresses not only the potential endogeneity of explanatory variables but also the effects of the lagged dependent variable and country-fixed effects. In this model, prostitution law, ratification and migration variables together with the lagged dependent variable are treated as endogenous and others as exogenous. To test for the validity of the instruments, the Hansen test on the exogeneity of the covariates is applied. The
Arellano-Bond test of second order autocorrelation (which must be absent from the data) is also conducted in order to test on the consistent estimator. The results of the Hansen test and the Arellano-Bond test do not reject the specification at conventional levels (see table 5 table 5 ), ordered logit estimation is implemented by using the predicted value obtained from
1 The matrix of instruments is collapsed in order to reduce the number of instruments for the efficiency. 2 However, the Cragg-Donald first-stage F-test (Cragg and Donald 1993; Stock et al. 2002) , which was additionally conducted by using the 2SLS method, fails to reject the null-hypothesis of weak instrument. It could be because of the linear assumption of the 2SLS approach. On the other hand, it may also suggest that abortion policy explains prostitution policy only to a limited extent. Given that alternative instruments are difficult to get by, I use this choice of instrument as an additional check for the results of the GMM method. 
Baseline Results
The baseline estimation is conducted by the ordered logit panel analysis with time-fixed effects (see table 2 ). In this baseline model, country-fixed effects are not included due to the incidental parameter problem (Lancaster 2000) . Instead, several time-invariant variables are controlled for in order to capture country characteristics and cultural factors which may affect the policy performance of victim protection. They are, namely, regional dummies, share of religions (Christian, Buddhist and Muslim) and legal origins (British, French, German, Scandinavian and Socialist). The main independent variable of interest is the prostitution law dummy indicating whether or not prostitution is legal. The other explanatory variables include income, institutional quality (control of corruption and democracy), international institution (ratification of the Anti-trafficking Protocol), gender (female labor force participation rate), migration (share of migrants in total populations) and crime (in-/outflows of human trafficking), as discussed above (see section 3.1). For the prostitution law variable, both the contemporary (columns 1 and 3) and one-year lagged values (columns 2 and 4) are employed, the latter capturing delayed effects driven from prostitution policy towards protection, if any. Columns
(1) and (2) show the results without controlling for time-invariant country characteristics and columns (3) and (4) are those with regional, religion and legal origin variables. Additionally, column (5) presents the results of the cross-sectional analysis without time dimensions.
The results indicate that legalized prostitution does not lead to any improvement in protection policy. Without controlling for the time-invariant effects (columns 1 and 2) and time effects (column 5), the coefficient is statistically insignificant. Taking into account the country characteristics and time effects (columns 3 and 4), the coefficient turns out to have a negative sign and it is statistically significant at 5% level. It suggests that the legalization of prostitution tends to worsen protection policy for victims of human trafficking or, at best, the legal standing of prostitution is irrelevant to the protection performance. The results are not altered by taking a one-year lagged value of the prostitution law variable.
Among the control variables, better institutional quality -the control of corruption and democracy -improves protection policy. Also, participation in the international anti-trafficking regime is positively associated with better protection. Women's economic empowerment provides better protection for victims of human trafficking -the majority being women and girls. The more human trafficking is prevalent, the better protection policy is exercised, in particular, in countries receiving higher inflows of human trafficking, indicating that the policy action is endogenous to the level of the crime. There is also some evidence that economic wealth leads to better protection, possibly because of the availability of resources necessary for policy implementation. Interestingly, a higher share of migrants in populations is negatively associated with protection policy. It appears that migrant communities do not seem to play a role in ensuring human rights protection for victims of trafficking -who are mostly irregular migrants -and the presence of migrants, rather, leads policy makers of the country not to protect victims, possibly because a higher influx of migration alarms local populations.
Quantitatively, the legalization of prostitution decreases probabilities to fully comply with protection policy (score 5) by 1% and adequately comply (score 4) by 5% (see table 3 ). Also, probabilities for modest policy performance (score 3) are reduced by 2% upon the legalization.
On the other hand, probabilities for poor policy performance increase by 6% and 1% (for scores 2 and 1, respectively) with the legalization of prostitution. In other words, legalization decreases probabilities to better perform protection policy above the average score (the mean score of protection is 2.84), while it increases probabilities for poorer performance.
Extension
Now I extend the baseline model by replacing the dependent variable with the other dimensions of anti-trafficking policy -prosecution of trafficking perpetrators and crime prevention. While protection policy reflects policy efforts for ensuring basic human rights for victims, the other two objectives stand for criminal justice and prevention directly targeting the reduction of the crime of human trafficking. Table 4 shows the results. Columns (1)- (3) present the results with prevention policy and columns (4)- (6) 
Latin America Score 5: The country does not punish victims of trafficking for acts related to the situations being trafficked; does not impose the self-identification of victims; and exerts STRONG efforts to give victims information on, and assistance for, relevant court and administrative proceedings, as well as support for the physical, psychological and social recovery of victims such as housing (shelter), medical assistance, job training, (temporal) residence permit, and other assistance for rehabilitation and repatriation.
Score 4: The country does not punish victims of trafficking for acts related to the situations being trafficked; does not impose the self-identification of victims; and exerts MODERATE efforts to give victims information on, and assistance for, relevant court and administrative proceedings, as well as support for the physical, psychological and social recovery of victims such as housing (shelter), medical assistance, job training, (temporal) residence permit, and other assistance for rehabilitation and repatriation.
Score 3: The country does not punish victims of trafficking for acts related to the situations being trafficked; does not impose the self-identification of victims; and exerts LIMITED efforts to give victims information on, and assistance for, relevant court and administrative proceedings, as well as support for the physical, psychological and social recovery of victims such as housing (shelter), medical assistance, job training, (temporal) residence permit, and other assistance for rehabilitation and repatriation. Or, if the country fails to ensure that victims of trafficking are never punished for acts related to the trafficking itself or the consequences of being trafficking BUT exerts STRONG/Moderate efforts in protecting victims, the country qualifies for score 3.
Score 2: The country fails to ensure that victims of trafficking are punished for acts related to the trafficking itself or to the consequences of being trafficked; and there is limited assistance and support for court proceedings and the recovery of victims. Or, the country does not punish victims of trafficking in persons for acts related to the situations being trafficked; however, does not provide any assistance or support for recovery, rehabilitation and repatriation.
Score 1: The country punishes victims of trafficking in persons for acts related to the situations being trafficked; and does not provide any assistance and support. 
